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The Melvin C. Steen Professorship
of Law Inaugural Lecture*
"Transcending the Ostensible": Some
Reflections on the Nature of Litigation
Between Governments
Robert E. Hudec**
"The anthropologist is not likely to harbor the naive assumption that
the law, or any other institution, serves only a single function-say,
that of social control .... The concept of ambivalence is part of his
equipment; 1he tends to search for latent functions, transcending the
ostensible."

The subject of this lecture is litigation between governments. It is generally assumed, at least among Western countries, that institutions of international cooperation should
include effective machinery for litigation of legal claims. A
working litigation procedure signifies a working legal order in
which conflicting interests are resolved by agreed rules rather
than by the rule of power.
The effectiveness of the litigation machinery in most international legal institutions usually falls short of comparable domestic litigation procedures. The right to initiate litigation is
not as certain, the procedure does not move forward as rapidly,
decisions are not made with the same degree of objectivity, and
legal rulings are not enforced as well.
The weaknesses of international litigation tend to be a constant source of concern. These weaknesses have political as
well as practical significance, for they can have a fairly substan*
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tial impact on public confidence in the international institution
in question and thus on the political support that will exist for
a government's policy of working through that institution.
The result of this concern over effectiveness is a more or
less continual effort to strengthen international litigation procedures. Most legal scholarship in the area is devoted to this
end, and proposals for improving litigation procedures can usually be found on the agenda of international organizations. In
times of institutional crisis, legal reform often rises to the top
of the agenda as one way to restore public confidence.
As in any other area of endeavor, the key to improving international litigation machinery is to understand what the
problems are and why they have occurred. One persistent impediment to such understanding, common to all international
legal institutions, is the observer's natural tendency to treat international legal institutions as though they were the same as
domestic legal institutions.
This tendency is especially pronounced in international litigation, because international litigation resembles its domestic law counterpart so closely. There is
a plaintiff and a defendant, a legal claim, a tribunal, and a legal
ruling at the end.
To say that international litigation is not necessarily the
same as litigation within domestic legal systems is almost too
obvious to need saying. And yet, it does need saying. Governments simply are not private litigants; they are governmentscomplex institutions known the world over for their inability to
behave like rational beings. Actually, government behavior
usually is rational in its own way, but it is the rationality of bureaucracies, of political coalitions, and of democratic electorates. Why governments litigate, and how they respond to
litigation, are questions that cannot be answered without taking
account of these very special characteristics of government
behavior.
In addition, international litigation is not domestic litigation. The fact that the decision of an international tribunal can
be telecopied around the world in thirty seconds does not make
the tribunal a modern legal institution. To the contrary, international legal arrangements have relatively more in common
with the law of primitive societies studied by anthropologists, in
which litigation is still emerging as a rather tenuous alternative
to dispute resolution by force. International litigation is an institution of indeterminate character. It is not an inevitable re-
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sponse to legal disputes, nor does it supply a conclusive
outcome.
Given, then, that international litigation involves distinctively different actors using a distinctively different institution,
we should, like the anthropologist, be prepared to find that it
serves distinctively different functions-functions that transcend our expectation of the ostensible. This lecture is intended to probe those differences by examining a current crisis
that has arisen over the effectiveness of the litigation procedure
in one particular international organization. In response to this
crisis, governments have tended to adopt conventional explanations of the litigation failure which caused it and have endorsed
a set of rather conventional reform proposals to bring about the
necessary improvements. I hope to demonstrate that the litigation giving rise to the crisis was not the conventional sort of litigation it was assumed to be, that the litigation failures were
likewise not the conventional sort of failures they were assumed to be, and that not even the government proposals for
dealing with the crisis are the solutions they seem to be. In the
course of explaining the distinctive characteristics of this particular litigation, I will try to identify some of the underlying
structural factors that cause litigation between governments to
differ so markedly from its domestic counterpart and will try to
show how these factors affect the prospects for making this
type of litigation work better.
The litigation crisis I shall describe concerns the law of international trade-the law that governs what governments may
and may not do to regulate the purchase and sale of goods
across their borders. International trade law is built mainly
around the 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,
known as the General Agreement or the GATT. The General
Agreement itself contains a large body of rules. In the forty
years since 1947, those rules have been expanded by an even
larger collection of amendments, side agreements, interpretations, and precedents. To administer this system, the General
Agreement has produced a large, international organization,
also known as the GATT.
The GATT has a litigation procedure for enforcing its
rules. The procedure is based on a brief provision in the General Agreement that authorizes the member countries of the
GATT, acting collectively, to rule on legal issues in dispute, to
issue recommendations calling for compliance, and to authorize
retaliation for serious violations. Over the years the GATT
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membership has gradually developed the practice of referring
legal complaints to a small panel of experts. Normally, panels
consist of three or five experienced GATT delegates from countries not involved in the legal dispute. Delegates act in their
personal
capacity, not under instruction from their
governments.
GATT panels function like appellate tribunals. The parties
to the dispute present written and oral legal arguments, usually
at two meetings about a month apart. The panel then meets in
closed session, where, assisted by the staff of the GATT Secretariat, it prepares a written report stating and explaining its
ruling. The report is referred to the GATT membership, which
alone has the power to rule.
The GATT has the tradition of decision making by consensus, which means that any GATT member country, including
the parties to the dispute, has the power to block the initiation
of the panel procedure or the adoption of a ruling. Notwithstanding this veto power, GATT litigants have developed a
strong tradition that parties will not block litigation against
themselves. It is established practice that complaining parties
are entitled to a panel adjudication if they want one. Until recently, established practice also dictated that while the losing
party could grumble and groan, it would not actually block
adoption of an adverse legal ruling.
It is the general practice of international organizations to
call things by names other than what they really are. That
practice is also followed in the GATT. The GATT's litigation
procedure is called dispute settlement-a nice sort of nonadversarial, nonthreatening, look-at-the-positive-side phrase for what
most people would call a lawsuit.
During the first thirty years of the GATT's existence, from
1948 to 1977, its litigation procedures achieved what is generally
considered to be an exceptional success. Member governments
filed eighty-two legal complaints. Of these, thirty-seven were
carried forward to either a legal ruling or some other kind of
formal report. Most of the rest were settled by negotiation. In
about eighty percent of these eighty-two cases, the country
bringing the complaint reported a satisfactory solution to the
problem. The basic force of the procedure came from the normative force of the decisions themselves and from community
pressure to observe them. Although retaliation was threatened
fairly often, until recently it was rarely used.
The results in the GATT's fourth decade have not been as
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happy. There has been a dramatic increase in the volume of litigation, with almost as many complaints and adjudications in
the past nine years as in the first thirty. Unfortunately, the
level of resistance to GATT rulings has also risen, rather dramatically. The main problem area has been litigation between
the United States and the European Community. The stage
was set by a protracted lawsuit over tax policy in which both
the United States and the European Community blocked adoption of adverse rulings by a 1976 panel for over six years. Then,
in each of four hard-fought cases brought by the United States
during a nine-month period in 1981-1982, the losing party once
again blocked acceptance of the adverse panel ruling. The malaise has continued to spread. In retaliation for the impasse in
the 1981-1982 cases, the United States is currently blocking
adoption of a 1986 panel ruling, and one other government has
recently followed suit in a totally unrelated case. The performance of panels has begun to falter under the pressure. Three
other panel decisions have been set aside as incorrect during
the past decade, and several more have encountered conspicuous dissatisfaction with the panel's inability to rule on what
were thought to be clear violations.
In September 1986 the GATT opened a new round of trade
negotiations, the Uruguay Round, designed to deal with the entire spectrum of problems currently troubling the world trading system. Fourteen negotiating groups were created. One of
these fourteen was devoted entirely to making dispute settlement more effective. Almost every country represented in the
negotiations has included improvements in GATT dispute settlement on its short list of priorities. To listen to United States
diplomats and members of Congress, reform of GATT dispute
settlement is not only a priority, but a sine qua non for continued United States participation in the GATT system.
On the surface the current problem in the GATT litigation
procedures appears to be a conventional legal impasse. The
critical conflict at the center of this problem concerns the agricultural trade policy of the European Community, the so-called
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). As is true with most
other farm programs, the political forces behind the CAP have
been very strong, causing CAP to guarantee very high prices to
producers, who in turn generate substantial overproduction of
farm products. The overproduction causes trade frictions, not
only in European markets, where imports must be excluded,
but also in world markets, where surplus European production
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must be disposed of by means of heavily subsidized export
sales. Against such very powerful political forces, the explanation goes, the GATT's law was simply not strong enough to
compel any changes. GATT substantive rules were not clear
enough, and dispute settlement procedures were not rigorous

enough.
The solutions being proposed to deal with this legal failure
are based on that perception of its causes. Everyone agrees that
better substantive rules are needed. Rules must spell out more
clearly what cannot be done and must have the support of a
fresh consensus behind their commands. A good deal of the energy is also being directed toward reform of the dispute settlement procedure itself.
The targets of procedural reform are obvious. The main
villain is the practice of consensual decision making. The
GATT has already given serious consideration to a proposal,
called consensus minus two, designed to cure this problem.
Under the proposal, the GATT would retain the general practice of consensual decision making, but when litigation proceedings are involved, consensus would be defined as everyone but
the two parties to the lawsuit--consensus minus two. In late
1982 the consensus minus two proposal came within a whisker
of being adopted; it was defeated only by a delayed objection
from the European Community.
A variety of other procedural reforms are also on the table.
There are proposals to change the membership of panels, either
by creating just one permanent tribunal of legal experts, or by
creating a small permanent roster of such experts from which
panel members must be drawn. Another proposal would increase the role of the GATT Secretariat, asking it to function as
an advocate general to assure proper representation of GATT
policy. Still another set of proposals calls for automatic access
to panels and time limits for the various stages of the proceeding. Finally, there is a long-standing demand for better followup procedures to ensure that the GATT maintains continual
pressure for compliance.
Unfortunately, while all of the proposals are quite useful,
they do not really come to grips with the underlying problem.
This was not ordinary litigation and did not fail for ordinary
reasons of legal weakness. To find out what really happened,
we must retrace our steps and go back over the story of the litigation crisis in more detail.
Recall that the central actor in this drama was the Euro-
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pean Community's Common Agricultural Policy. The CAP
posed a threat to agricultural exporters in the United States.
That threat grew throughout the 1960s and early 1970s as the
production induced by Community price supports increased and
as one after another agricultural interest in the United States
found its trade affected. The United States interests threatened
by the CAP were politically important, and they wanted action.
As is usually the case, however, there were also several
conflicting interests at play. Initially, the United States had a
broad foreign policy goal of making sure that the European
Community survived as an institution. This meant minimizing
difficult economic demands that might cause it to fracture. As
the Community became more solidly established, this foreign
policy consideration diminished. It was replaced, however, by
another, stronger economic interest. In 1961, as part of the deal
to secure United States acceptance of the CAP, the Community
had agreed to abolish all import restraints on two key commodities, soybeans and feed grains. Led by these two sectors,
United States exports of agricultural products to the Community grew with unexpected rapidity from about $1 billion in the
early 1960s to about $9 billion in the early 1980s. These trade
gains were far larger than the trade losses caused by the CAP.
The gainers were definitely not interested in having a trade
war with the Community.
These conflicting interests presented a problem for the
United States government when the Community thought it
necessary to take action that harmed the losers. The losers
could not simply be ignored. In addition to the political power
of their own representatives, the losers also had the power to
persuade others that the international trading system was operating unfairly, and that the United States ought not to follow
liberal trade policies under such conditions. But if the United
States government acted too vigorously, it would jeopardize the
much larger trade interests of the gainers.
Politicians who deal with such conflicting interests on a
regular basis know that one of the most valuable techniques for
dealing with them is to temporize. Government officials buy
time by promising the losers that they too will be taken care of,
and then hope that by the time the promise becomes due, the
losers will have adjusted their sights low enough to be satisfied
with what little can actually be done for them.
Temporizing has a bad name that is not really deserved.
Something like this has to happen whenever large collective
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entities like nation-states seek to accommodate differing interests. To reach accommodation each of the collectivities must be
willing to abandon some of the interests of some of its participants-interests which, in the abstract, it would be expected to
defend. To use the jargon of the union hall, someone will have
to be "sold out." Given that these sellouts have to occur, it is
only common sense to try to make them occur as peacefully as
possible. It is not in anyone's interest to have domestic conflict
over them. Thus, any device which helps to smooth the process
by which the losers learn to accept their losses actually makes a
valuable contribution to the cohesion, and thus the well-being,
of the entire collective entity. It also keeps politicians in office,
of course.
International law and litigation happen to provide useful
instruments for carrying out such temporizing. Their key attribute is their indeterminate character. Because the definition
and enforcement of international legal norms often tend to be
uncertain, international obligations and other legal actions can
supply just the kind of temporizing solutions governments look
for in these situations-vigorous action which appears to promise protection, but which may turn out to be less than fully effective when the time comes.
When a government is unable to secure true protection for
certain interests, the first form of temporizing will usually be
the imperfect international legal commitment-a vague or
highly qualified engagement from the other government that
suggests a great deal more than it actually promises or means
to deliver. Negotiators usually refer to this process as "getting
something" for the losing interest. No matter how weak the
something is, experience teaches that it is always better than
nothing.
International litigation can provide second-stage temporizing. When the ineffective legal obligation does not protect
the loser's interest, government is expected to do something. A
punch in the nose would do nicely, but of course there are all
those other interests being held hostage. What is needed is a
punch that will not hit anyone. International litigation is the
perfect answer. It is action, or at least something that looks
like action. And it takes time, usually lots and lots of time.
Time, of course, is the objective. Generally speaking, both
politicians and diplomats regard tomorrow as the preferred
time for dealing with unanswerable problems. Some tomorrows are especially propitious, such as the one that occurs the
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day after the trade problem has subsided and the offending
measure has been withdrawn. Another favorable tomorrow is
the one that occurs the day after major trade legislation is
voted on. It is interesting to note that almost all the United
States GATT litigation from 1960-1975 was bunched around
congressional consideration of the two major trade acts in 1962
and 1974.
The United States government made repeated promises to
those who were to be injured by the evolution of the Common
Agricultural Policy. The promises included all manner of government efforts, diplomatic and political as well as legal. Time
does not permit dealing with each promise or with every case
that used GATT litigation. I shall concentrate on the one example that is most directly related to the 1981-1982 litigation
crisis-the story of the United States's effort to impose GATT
legal control over export subsidies.
The first chapter of the story takes place in an earlier
round of GATT trade negotiations, the Tokyo Round, held
from 1973 to 1979. Like the current Uruguay Round, the Tokyo
Round was an attempt to deal with trade problems across the
board. One of the problems the United States government had
to solve was political unrest at home over its policy toward the
Common Agricultural Policy. One of the main sources of unrest was the apparent inability of the United States to limit the
Community's ever-increasing use of export subsidies. United
States exporters whose foreign markets were threatened by the
heavily subsidized European exports wanted the United States
to take some action, retaliation if necessary, to stop them. The
United States government sought to deflect these pressures for
warlike action by promising to negotiate more effective GATT
rules-a new Subsidies Code that would provide for effective
legal control of export subsidies.
The Subsidies Code was also meant to deal with another
urgent problem in United States trade policy. The United
States was saddled with a very restrictive countervailingduty
law, passed by Congress in 1890, which provided for the imposition of special duties on imports subsidized by exporting countries. The criteria of the law were inconsistent with GATT
rules, but the law itself was technically GATT-legal under a
grandfather clause permitting continuation of certain pre-1947
legislation. Congress was willing to limit the law's criteria as
the GATT required, but only, it said, if other GATT governments paid something for the surrender of this rather tenuous

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:211

legal right. A new Subsidies Code was the logical quid pro quo
to satisfy this demand for payment.
The Subsidies Code negotiations ran into difficulties from
the outset. Early in the Tokyo Round, it was learned that the
Community's mandate did not permit it to accept any new obligations limiting the use of subsidies. Community negotiators
were authorized only to affirm and restate those subsidy obligations already contained in existing GATT texts. In addition to
taking this rigid position, and actually one of the major reasons
for it, the Community made it clear that it was not prepared to
make any fundamental changes in its Common Agricultural
Policy. This latter position appeared to mean that overproduction and the infusion of heavily subsidized exports into world
markets would continue.
Notwithstanding this very discouraging prospectus, both
sides agreed to go forward with the Subsidies Code negotiations. This decision is a significant bit of evidence about how
governments tend to use international legal norms in a situation like this. Both sides wanted what the Subsidies Code could
buy, but neither was able to come up with the payment. So
they decided to negotiate something that would look like
payment.
It is worth underlining "both sides." The United States
government wanted to correct the countervailing duty law as
much as any other government did because the United States
knew that its own producers would suffer as much as anyone
else from an outbreak of trade hostilities. While the United
States undoubtedly would have preferred to obtain a strong
Subsidies Code in the bargain, it realized that changing the law
without a quid pro quo would be better than not changing it at
all. By the same token, the United States government also
wanted to avoid being forced to retaliate over the issue of export subsidies. The United States was therefore willing to oversell the legal value of a weak Subsidies Code if that would buy
some time.
If the United States was willing to pretend, so were the
other governments. The other governments knew that the
United States would have to present "something" if it intended
to sell the Subsidies Code as a quid pro quo. Thus, although
they may have been instructed to create no new legal engagements, they too had to finesse their instructions and create a
little something-as little as possible, to be sure, but enough to
make the Code look like "something."
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At the end of the Tokyo Round in 1979, the negotiators announced that the Subsidies Code negotiations had been a success. The Code's thirty-three pages of new GATT text
contained much that merely papered over disagreements that
could not be resolved, but there were a few useful clarifications
of old obligations, and even a few small obligations and remedies that were new. The Code also contained a new and quite
rigorous dispute settlement procedure, complete with automatic
access, time limits, and follow-up procedures. This was perhaps
the European Community's largest concession. It was as
though, being barred from making any substantive concessions,
the Community negotiators had turned to dispute settlement as
the only thing left to give. (It would not be the last time that
governments would turn to strengthened dispute settlement as
a substitute for failed substantive negotiations.)
The temporizing was not yet over. Although the Community's negotiators were satisfied with this text, the European
Community itself started having difficulties internally with its
own mandate to accept this agreement. Some member governments became concerned that, little as it said, the new Code
could still lead to legal actions seeking to undermine the Common Agricultural Policy. They asked for some assurance that
the new Code would not be used in this manner. To resolve
this last minute crisis, the chief United States negotiator wrote
a secret and confidential letter to the chief Community negotiator. The existence of the letter has since been acknowledged,
but its exact contents have never been made public. According
to second-hand reports, the letter was one of those artfully
drafted diplomatic documents that permitted each side to claim
that it had won its point.
The main significance of the letter is its demonstration df
how little actual consensus there was behind the Subsidies
Code. The Community had agreed to little more than a new
dispute settlement procedure, and even that concession now appeared to have only qualified support at home. Of course, the
secret letter did not amount to a complete pullback by the
Community because both the secrecy of the letter and its presumably vague wording made it worth relatively little. Indeed,
the function of the letter within the Community was almost
certainly to facilitate the same sort of temporizing that was going on in the United States. The letter was a little something
the Community negotiators could give to mollify the losers who
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had wanted no Subsidies Code at all. The Community too was
postponing its hard choices until tomorrow.
In the United States, meanwhile, the Subsidies Code was
being presented as a major accomplishment. The presentation
worked. The promise of greater legal discipline over export
subsidies succeeded in deflecting pressure for more aggressive
action against the CAP-for a while. The United States Congress accepted the Code as a sufficient quid pro quo for amending the restrictive countervailing duty law.
United States acceptance of the Subsidies Code tells us a
good deal about the temporizing function of international legal
arrangements. The quid pro quo episode is particularly interesting. Who was fooling whom about the value of the Subsidies
Code? Was the Administration fooling Congress? Was Congress fooling its constituents by pretending to believe in the
value of the Code when it knew better? Come to think of it,
was anybody fooling anybody?
As far as I have been able to determine, the existence of
the letter was known to key congressional staff members and
thus was certainly known to the members of Congress on the
key committees. One executive branch official described it as
"the worst kept secret in Washington." To my knowledge,
however, the congressional hearings and committee reports for
this legislation contain absolutely no reference to the letter.
The reason for this, assumedly, was that Congress wanted to
vote for the measures in question whether or not there was a
quid pro quo but believed that having the Subsidies Code as an
apparent quid pro quo made it easier to do so. That Congress
wanted to vote for these measures is not difficult to believe.
Judging from its behavior over the past thirty years, Congress
basically is not a protectionist institution, and the countervailing duty law in question really was pretty bad as it stood.
All Congress really needed, then, was a good justificationsomeone else to blame if things turned sour. The representation that the United States was gaining an effective Subsidies
Code met that need perfectly. The last thing any legislator
wanted, therefore, was to be told about the secret letter.
It was not necessary that the Code actually fool the affected constituency. The agricultural interests being hurt by
Community subsidies almost certainly knew enough to know
that Jack was trading the family cow for a bag of magic beans.
It was only necessary that the Code be plausible to voters in
general, so that legislators could say, in defense of their vote,
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"The Code is a better approach; it should be given a chance to
work." The possibility of being able to take such a stance, even
if it is not believed by everyone, is a great advantage.
If the story of the Subsidies Code teaches any lesson, it is
to underline just how useful and inviting the overselling of international legal institutions can be. It solves problems for any
number of participants in the political process. Consequently,
one should be ready to find, in almost any particular structure
of international obligations, a significant number of what might
be called paper obligations-apparent engagements which do
not in fact reflect any real consensus or commitment. And
when one finds the tendency to create paper obligations coupled with the tendency to write more rigorous litigation rules,
one can expect to find dramatic legal failures.
The dramatic failures that occurred in this case were the
four legal complaints filed by the United States in 1981-1982. By
mid-1981, it had become clear that the European Community
was not responding any better to legal complaints about the
CAP than it had before. Accordingly, the new Reagan administration came under pressure to demonstrate the new legal
weapons that had been presented as the fruits of the Tokyo
Round. After all that had been promised, the Reagan administration had no alternative but to litigate.
Of the four United States complaints against European agricultural policy, two were based on the new Subsidies Code
rules against export subsidies, one was based on an earlier
GATT rule limiting the use of internal subsidies, and one concerned discriminatory tariffs. Each complaint asked for a legal
ruling that would have forced a major change in the operation
of the CAP. In each case the Community argued strongly that
the issues were not suitable for adjudication, mentioning among
other things the secret letter, which it represented as a promise
not to bring lawsuits seeking such politically impossible results.
The Community resisted each step of the procedure and then
fought each case on the merits with an exceptional vigor that
frequently turned into bitterness.
The United States lost the first Subsidies Code decision despite a fairly good case on the numbers. Choosing to believe
that the panel had been cowed by the Community's intransigent position, the United States refused to accept the panel decision and tried, unsuccessfully, to persuade the other
government signatories of the Subsidies Code to overturn it.
The second Subsidies Code case resulted in a rare split vote on
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the panel, a three-to-one decision in favor of the United States's
complaint. The Community refused to regard the majority ruling as more authoritative than the minority ruling. The two
other cases resulted in unanimous decisions sustaining at least
part of the United States's claim, but the Community also refused to accept either of these decisions.
The three cases lost by the Community were eventually
settled in 1986-1987. In two of the cases the Community practices complained of were partially modified, and in the other
case, the challenged practice was altered as part of a larger deal
involving numerous concessions on both sides. The case lost by
the United States also produced a slight modification of the
Community practice for a brief period, but the issue was subsequently overtaken by what amounts to a much broader subsidy
war among the United States, the Community, and others. As
of this date, none of the decisions has been adopted.
At the outset of this lecture, I said that neither the litigation crisis nor the reforms proposed to solve it were what they
appeared to be. The meaning of that statement should now be
clear.
The crisis itself had nothing to do with the strength or
weakness of the GATT litigation procedures. These procedures
failed because they were asked to enforce a promise that the
European Community had never made-or, more accurately, a
promise at which the European Community had only hinted.
Calling this outcome a failure of the litigation procedure is actually a sort of cover-up, an attempt to shift the blame to the
GATT's litigation procedures when in fact responsibility lies in
the earlier negotiating failures of the Tokyo Round.
It has to be admitted, however, that the cover-up is a
rather nice one because it defines the current weakness of the
GATT in terms of something that can probably be done. Even
if governments remain unwilling in the Uruguay Round to accept more rigorous substantive rules, they should at least be
able to reach agreement on some new procedural rules that can
be held out as improvements of the litigation machinery. The
outcome is already foreseeable: adoption of consensus minus
two, more time limits, more automaticity, and probably one or
two efforts to improve the legal quality of the decisions and of
the decision makers. This done, negotiators and their governments will be able to declare that substantial progress has been
made and that the new legal remedies will better protect the
interests not so well protected before. This will buy some time.
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Eventually, of course, there will have to be another cycle of litigation to test the new promises. What happens then will depend, once again, not so much on the new procedures, but on
what has been accomplished in the interim on matters of substance. And so the cycle will go on, one supposes, into the next
century.
There probably is no alternative to this process of staggering from one inadequate form of temporizing to another. The
underlying conflicts between various interests are real and unending. Ordinary mortals, working through imperfect institutions, have only a limited capacity to fashion long-term
solutions. Long ago, a diplomat advised me, "There are no real
solutions to problems in this business; the best that can be
hoped for are short-term expedients that keep things together
until the next crisis."
There must be something about a legal education, however,
that makes one believe in the invisible hand, or in the inchoate
wisdom of common law development. It is possible, I think, to
identify some kinds of halting progress amid all this wreckage.
Consider two examples from the story told today.
First, consider what happened to the European Community. The Community wanted no new pressures on the CAP,
but it could not have both complete satisfaction of that goal and
the changes of United States policy offered for a Subsidies
Code. So the Community agreed to a slight compromise in its
position, accepting a Subsidies Code that just hinted at new obligations but more than just hinted at a new dispute settlement
procedure. The Community paid dearly for these concessions
with several years of bitter litigation and with the lion's share
of the diplomatic blame for wrecking GATT law. The Community eventually had to make some partial corrections in its policy to get out of the mess. Moreover, the mere creation of a
Subsidies Code has added new pressures to the next round of
demands, because the subsidies issue has now become not only
a matter of economic policy, but also a matter of the GATT's
legal credibility. This is movement-halting, inadequate, and
unstable, but it does seem to be going somewhere.
Second, despite all the battering it has taken over the past
decade, the GATT litigation procedure still has a good chance
of emerging as a stronger legal institution than it was when the
decade began. Even though procedural reforms do not address
the main problem underlying the hard cases, they do affect
what happens in the more ordinary cases. In cases of minor sig-
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nificance, the GATT's current procedure has already demonstrated a capacity for crisp and professional decision making
that it simply did not have ten years ago. The extraordinary attention being given to dispute settlement reform in the current
negotiations will create additional pressure to show that dispute
settlement works. This pressure, together with the specific reforms that are adopted, is going to make it even more difficult
to avoid or reject legal rulings in ordinary cases.
GATT dispute settlement will probably always teeter on
the edge of crisis, for there will always be a tendency to use it
to cover up substantive failures. I like to believe, however, that
if GATT dispute settlement keeps its balance for another forty
years, governments may end up creating an effective litigation
procedure in spite of themselves.

